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Jet fires are often considered to be a “minor” fire accident, as compared to pool or tank fires. However, if there 
is flames impingement on an equipment very high heat flux densities will be reached, which can originate its 
failure; thus, jet fires can be the primary step of a domino effect sequence. Diverse circumstances can play an 
important role in this situation, as the existence and condition of fireproofing or the presence of a liquid or a 
gas inside the equipment. An interesting case is that of pipelines; often diverse pipes are installed in the same 
hallway, due to the difficulty and cost of establishing this path. In this case, a high-velocity release in one of 
the pipes can affect the others by domino effect, essentially through erosion (buried pipes) or thermal effects 
(aerial and also buried pipes if a crater allows the existence of fire). In the event of a jet fire, flames 
impingement on another pipe can occur. If there is a thermal insulation, it can be damaged or even can be 
eroded by the action of a jet. Inside the pipe different conditions can exist: a) continuous flow of a liquid: pipe 
wall will be cooled and can be considered protected; b) stagnant liquid (for ex., because blocking valves are 
closed): the liquid can boil, pressure can increase and the wall in contact with vapor can reach high 
temperatures and fail; c) co flow of a gas or stagnant gas: the wall temperature will increase to dangerous 
values, a failure is probable. A versatile indoor small size experimental unit has been constructed allowing the 
testing and analysis of these situations. The case of pipelines is studied, both from the analysis of real cases 
and experimental tests. Conclusions are obtained concerning the measures that can be applied to decrease 
the risk of these accidents.  
1. Introduction 
Jet fires are often smaller than pool fires and in many cases they do not lead to severe effects, as their 
thermal radiation flux is relatively small and decreases quickly with the distance; furthermore, in certain cases 
they can be quickly stopped just by closing a valve. So, probably the occurrence of these type of fires is really 
higher than the one that could be inferred from the data registered in accident databases, as many small jet 
fires without significant consequences are not included. This is probably also the reason why certain safety 
measures, as for example, the practices for equipment fireproofing, take into account just the effects of pool 
fires and do not consider those from jet fires (Badri et al., 2013). However, if there is impingement of the 
flames on an equipment, heat fluxes can be very high due to the simultaneous effect of both radiative and, 
even more important, convective heat transfer (Landucci et al., 2013; Scarponi et al., 2018). This, together 
with the possible erosion effect of the high velocity jet (which can contribute to damaging a fireproofing layer), 
can originate in a short time the failure of a vessel or a pipe, thus originating the secondary domino effect 
accident, which can be another fire, an explosion or a toxic release. The size and geometry of a jet fire varies 
as a function of the fuel flowrate and of the jet direction (vertical, horizontal or inclined). 
Jet fires can occur when there is the continuous release of a flammable gas (through a hole, a broken pipe, a 
safety relief valve) which is ignited; the ignition source can be another fire, an impact, an electrostatic spark, 
etc. If there is a release of a two-phase fluid of a pressurized liquefied gas, the possibilities are somewhat 
more complex (Vílchez et al., 2011), but again a jet fire will occur if there is ignition. 
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In the case of gas or two-phase release (this second one originated by the flash vaporization of a liquid), it 
should be taken into account that in most cases the jet will be a high momentum one, with sonic velocity at the 
outlet (for most gases, sonic velocity will be reached when the pressure inside the vessel or the pipe is equal 
or higher than approximately 2 bar abs). This is an important fact, as it implies a higher turbulence, a more 
important air entrainment and a better combustion of the fuel, with higher heat fluxes in the case of flame 
impingement; it can also imply the aforementioned erosion effect on an insulation layer.  
Pipelines are the most important mode for transporting fluids over long distances. Even though this is 
considered to be generally a safe system, accidents occur from time to time: corrosion, third party activities, 
mechanical failures and other causes can originate the loss of containment, which, if the released material is 
flammable, can imply a fire. Often several parallel pipes are installed in the same hallway, because of practical 
and economical reasons. In this case, if a jet fire occurs in one of them, the probability that it impinges on 
another one will be a function of the jet direction and length, the diameter of both pipelines and the distance 
between them (Ramírez-Camacho et al., 2015). In the case of buried pipelines this can also happen when a 
crater is formed by an explosion or by the pressurized release; if both the primary and the target pipes are 
inside the crater, jet fire impingement can occur. If the target pipe conveys a gas and it is no thermally 
insulated or the insulation has been damaged, the pipe wall temperature can reach quickly a high and 
dangerous value. If it conveys a liquid, its cooling potential will protect the pipe; however, if the action of 
blocking valves stops the flow, the risk will significantly increase. A few representative examples of these 
accidents have been included in Table 1; the information on such cases available in the literature is rather 
scarce. 
Therefore, experimental tests can be a very useful tool to analyze the behavior of a pipe conveying or 
containing a given fluid, or protected by a given fireproofing layer, when subjected to the action of jet fire 
impingement. A versatile indoor small size experimental unit has been constructed, which can be used to 
reproduce such situations under different conditions. Data obtained on propane jet fires impinging on a pipe in 
different conditions are presented. 
2. Experimental set-up 
An experimental set-up was designed and constructed to obtain data on propane gas medium size jet fires 
characteristics and effects (Figure 1). It can originate horizontal jet fires with a length up to 3 m, using different 
gas pressures and outlet orifice diameters. In this communication, jet fires impinged on a carbon steel pipe 
(11.5 cm outside diameter, 6 mm wall thickness) containing stagnant air or water. An industrial propane bottle 
was used as the source of gas. For safety purposes, two safety valves, manual and electrical, respectively 
(plus the one in the bottle) were installed. All these elements were located on a portable structure to increase 
the operational flexibility during the tests. The flow rate, pressure and temperature of the propane feeding the 
jet fire were measured. The propane pressure was measured at a point located 12 cm up-stream the release 
point; the jet temperature at the release point was also measured with a K type thermocouple. A set of K type 
thermocouples located inside the pipe wall allowed the measurement of the wall temperature during the tests.  
 
 
Figure 1: Scheme of the experimental setup 
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The jet fire was filmed with both a visible and an infrared thermographic camera, located orthogonally to the 
flame. Two heat flow sensors (Schmidt-Boelter type) were located at different distances from the flame. The 
values of pressure, temperature and radiant heat flux were continuously registered during the tests through a 
data acquisition system (Field Point) from the aforementioned measuring devices. 
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3. Flames impingement on a pipe 
In all but one tests, flames were from a sonic gas jet, as this is the most common situation (chocked flow)  in 
the event of a release (with propane gas, the velocity at the hole is sonic if Pgas pipe/Patm > 1.75); the hole 
diameter was d = 6 mm. The length of the visible flames (corrected for the curvature) could be predicted with 
relatively good accuracy by the expression Lflame = d · Re0.4 (Palacios and Casal, 2011). A typical jet can be 
seen in Figure 2, together with the infrared image. Because of very high flow velocity and restricted fuel and 
air mixing just after release, the combustion can only take place further downstream, where lift-off point is 
marked by a blue combustion annulus flame, at approximately 0.25 m from the hole. From this point, the 
length of the visible flames was approximately 1.2 m. The flames shape was somewhat disturbed by the 
presence of the target pipe.  
3.1 Gas inside the pipe, sonic jet 
The temperature of a pipe subjected to jet fire impingement increases quickly when it conveys or contains a 
gas. Figure 3 shows the temperature evolution registered by four thermocouples (K type) located (inside the 
wall) on top, bottom, front and back, respectively, of a perimeter of the pipe (stagnant air inside) receiving the 




Figure 2: Propane jet fire impinging on a pipe (d = 6 mm; Dpipe = 11.5 cm). Top: visible image; bottom: IR 
image (the wake of a thermocouple modified somewhat the condition just after the lift-off). 
The front surface, TC-1, underwent the highest heating, due to the higher turbulence and the more intense 
convective contribution (heating rates during the first half a minute: 6.5 ºC s-1). The heating velocity decreased 
afterwards gradually, reaching a temperature of 600 ºC after 2.5 min from the start of the jet fire (this would 
correspond approximately to a 50 % of the strength ratio of carbon steel at room temperature) and 750  ºC 
(approximate steel strength ratio: 15 %) after 5.5 minutes. Test duration: 9.8 minutes. 
 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of pipe wall temperatures as a function of time (stagnant air inside the pipe, sonic jet) 
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The thermocouple located in the bottom wall (TC-4) of the pipe registered lower -even though very high- 
temperatures, reaching a maximum temperature of 737 ºC . Somewhat lower temperatures were registered by 
the top and back wall thermocouples (TC-2, TC-3), even if the pipe wall was in contact with the flames; this 
could probably be attributed to the lower convective contribution on the pipe external surface originated by the 
negative influence of the jet fire wake. Taking into account all these temperatures, this must be considered a 
situation that would lead to the failure of a pipe subjected to internal pressure. 
3.2 Liquid inside the pipe, sonic jet 
If the pipe contains or conveys a liquid, the surface of the wall in contact with it (i.e., the section of the wall 
under the liquid level) will be cooled by the liquid, which after a short time will start boiling, and its temperature 
will reach much lower values. Figure 4 shows the temperature evolution of the different points of a pipe 
subjected to the impingement of a jet fire (with essentially the same features than that in Figure 2); in this 
case, stagnant water was contained in the pipe.  
 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of pipe wall temperatures as a function of time (stagnant water inside the pipe, sonic jet) 
The water level covered the wall at the position of thermocouples TC-4 (bottom) and TC-3 (back).  The top 
surface (TC-2) was not in contact with the liquid, although it was probably cooled by the bubbles erupting from 
the boiling water; furthermore, in this test, the flame impingement on top of the pipe was rather light, this is 
why the maximum temperature reached was significantly lower than in the case of Figure 3. Finally, the front 
thermocouple (TC-1) was just at the height corresponding to water level, reaching an approximately constant 
and intermediate temperature. Similar results (to TC-2, TC-3 and TC-4) were obtained by Birk et al. (2006), 
with longer exposure times, when studying the flames impingement on a vessel. A maximum temperature of 
375 ºC for the front thermocouple was reached after 9 min of exposure, and 400 ºC for the top one (now the 
cooling effect of the jet wake was negligible). Instead, thermocouples at the wall under water level reached a 
maximum temperature of just 120 ºC. 
3.3 Liquid inside the pipe, low-velocity jet 
If there is a low velocity jet, for example because the pressure in the source pipe has decreased significantly, 
then the turbulence in the jet and the entrainment of air will decrease; consequently, the combustion in the jet 
will be poor: the flame will be brighter due to the existence of soot particles, but its temperature will be lower. 
Therefore, the temperature increase at the pipe wall, even if it will increase quickly at the start of the 
impingement, will reach lower values than in the case of a sonic jet. Figure 5 shows the temperature evolution 
in the case of a subsonic jet (u = 40 m/s) impinging on a pipe containing stagnant water. Thermocouples TC-4 
(bottom) and TC-3 (back) were on the wall in contact with water, while TC-1 (front) and TC-2 (top) were 
located in the wall above water level.  
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Figure 5: Evolution of pipe wall temperatures as a function of time (stagnant water in the pipe, low-velocity jet) 
4. Conclusions 
Although jet fire accidents are underrepresented in accidents databases, it is a fact that they have been the 
origin of important domino effect sequences. In the case of parallel and close pipelines, if a loss of 
containment of a flammable gas or two-phase flow occurs through a hole –originated by corrosion, excavating 
machinery or other causes- and it gets ignited, the possibility of flames impingement on a secondary pipe can 
create a very dangerous situation. The data obtained from an experimental setup, designed for performing 
indoor tests with small and medium size jet fires, have shown that impingement can imply very high heat 
fluxes, originating extremely high temperatures in the pipe wall if there is no fire proofing or it has been 
damaged. With stagnant gas inside the pipe, temperatures of the order of 600 ºC were reached in 2-3 minutes 
(heating rates of the order of 6.5 ºC s-1), and of 750 ºC in 5-6 min. When the pipe contained a liquid, the wall in 
contact with it was cooled and the situation was less dangerous. These data emphasize the fact that safety 
distances must be considered essential in pipelines hallways, together with fire proofing and other safety 
measures. The analysis of historical cases show that jet fire impingement can occur even in buried pipes if a 
crater is formed. 
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